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functional connectives-'lends itself directly to radical translation' (WO, p. 57). Stroud interprets this as implying that Quine distinguishes in kind between (at least some) portions of logic and all other nonobservational sentences, viz., the latter, but not the former, are subject to the indeterminacy of translation of theoretical sentences. Unlike Stroud, Dummett maintains that Quine observes no such distinction in epistemological kind; indeed, he believes that Quine's scruples preclude any such distinction. However, Dummett also thinks that the absence of such distinctions has unfortunate consequences for Quine's philosophy of language. Specifically, it prevents Quine from offering any specific analysis of language.
I show that both Stroud and Dummett are mistaken, and, more generally, that their respective mistakes arc a result of a failure to perceive the relevant epistemological stance which Quine adopts for the problems they discuss. When the two epistemological positions, which Quine consistently conflates, are distinguished, it can be seen that Quine has not, as Stroud believes, held logic aloof from the problems posed by the indeterminacy of translation of theoretical sentences; nonetheless, it can be seen why Dummett is incorrect in maintaining that Quine's holism precludes his talking meaningfully about language. I begin by sharpening the distinction in epistemological views in question. I then look at the specific criticisms proferred by Stroud and Dummett.
One of Quine's distinct epistemological theses emphasizes his holistic conception of theories; this is his Duhemian Thesis (DT).
(DT) Theoretical sentences have their meaning and their evidence not as single sentences but only as larger blocks of theory.
The DT is a theory about theories; it implies that any theoretical sentence is known to be true or false only relative to some containing theory.' In particular, Quine holds the DT to be true both of natural languages and natural sciences; DT is an epistemological precept, but it is not formulated within some one scientific theory. This last point is critical in as much as Quine's second type of epistemological thesis maintains that work on the nature of human knowledge is to be carried out within a specific natural scientific framework. This is Quine's Epistemology Naturalized Thesis (ENT). The foregoing argument shows that the reasons for granting DT cannot be reasons adduced from within a naturalized epistemology. The DT is to apply both to theories in the extended sense of the term (and so to pre-scientific, natural language discourse) and to theories in a narrower sense, i.e., to scientific theories which 'refine' our more casual idiom for speaking about the world. The ENT envisages epistemology, by hypothesis, as contained in some particular theory.
(ENT
DT is presented as an a priori limit to knowledge; it delimits the most general nature of human knowledge. The naturalized epistemologist,on the other hand, is attempting to explain how we know as much as we do. Quine's claim that sentences are, one and all, revisable, his continued use of the web metaphor when speaking of theories in both the extended and technical senses, would be trivialized by making DT a truth of scientific theory. DT is of epistemological moment only if we separate it from Quine's pragmatic and programmatic vision of epistemology. It is not my purpose here to defend DT, or even to say what the arguments for it might be. My concern, rather, is to indicate the need to distinguish the DT and ENT in order to make perspicuous the fundamental significance of Quine's Duhemian views to his epistemology.
Given DT, one accepts that it is only within theories in the extended sense that judgements of the truth and falsity of sentences can be made; given ENT, one chooses the accepted scientific canons as determinative of one's method of investigation. However, the consequences of the DT are not truths of science, and the truths of some one theory have no philosophical status, i.e., no claim to being a priori truths about theories per se. Stroud's belief that Quine gives special epistemological status to the translatability of logical connectives is a result of just such a confusion between particular scientific truths and what Quine holds to be true of theories.
Stroud's suggestion that Quine has undergone a change of heart regarding the revisability of logical truths is quashed by Quine in his subsequent remarks on Stroud's paper (WsOs, pp. 3I6-319).
Indeter to revision; these canons are not secured by any argument concerning the conditions for any possible translation. In order to give any methodological canon pride of epistemological place-to show that it could not be otherwise-would require such arguments. Stroud confuses the rigidity of the semantics for defining logical connectives with epistemological distinctiveness.
The truths of logic and mathematics are, Quine insists, part of science, and so not to be distinguished from other portions of our theory about man's natural environment. This is not meant to suggest, of course, that all the sentences of received theory are equally likely candidates for revision. In order to understand in what sense logical laws are open to revision, it is helpful to look at the constraints which govern changes in the ontology of a theory. The considerations which underlie Quine's adherence to the canon 'preserve logical truth' are basically those which he musters in defence of the received scientific notion of reality. Ontological revision can proceed bit by bit from within the language/theory we inherit; however, we cannot discard our current lore of physical objects all at once, for then we would lose whatever sense the word 'reality' has for us. We cannot draw a distinction between what is and what is not without preserving, at least initially, part of the current basis for drawing such a distinction.' Quine's point seems unobjectionable. We have certain (linguistic) resources for distinguishing between genuine objects and fictional ones, and if we attempt to abandon these very resources, all at once, we abandon, in effect, the distinction in question. We must husband these resources and take a piecemeal approach to changes in our account of reality. And what is true of ontological discourse is true, also, of our discourse concerning logical truth. However, in the case of logical laws, there is an important twist. For our logical laws are so interconnected that it is difficult to effect isolated revisions. 'Dropping a logical law means a devastatingly widespread unfixing of truth values of contexts of the particles concerned, leaving no fixity to rely on in using those particles' (WO, p. 6o). There is a sense, in other words, in which any revision in logical laws 'unfixes' the whole system, or might threaten to do so.
Stroud, in other words, confuses the constraints imposed by the ENT on the epistemologist with the constraints governing any possible theory. This is a mistake; the determinacy which current theory dictates with regard to translating logical connectives cannot be extended to cover all possible theories. Ironically, Dummett appreciates this point, i.e., that logic falls within the ENT, and so is, in principle, open to revision. However, he insists that this inclusion generates a serious problem for Quine's epistemology. Specifically, Quine has constructed a philosophy of language within which we are prevented from talking about language.
Dummett notes that, for Quine, it is a mistake to regard individual theoretical sentences as significant taken in isolation from their theories. Rather, if we are to talk of their meaning at all, we must do so against the background of other statements of that theory which we accept as meaningful. But exactly how are we to explicate this relation? What is needed, Dummett suggests, is 'some way of understanding in what the inferential connections between sentences consist'.2 But any statement about the inferential connections is itself part of the theory which we are, ex hypothesi, trying to explain. So now the statement about the inferential connections between sentences consist'.' But any statement if these inference rules are subject to revision, as Quine maintains, then we must be able to specify them. But how is specification possible? That is, any statements adduced for the purpose are, if meaningful and true, part of a theory; but it is precisely the relation among sentences in our theory which we wanted to clarify. Quine's view of theoretical sentences is that they are all of a kind; but in order to talk about the rules of a system even if only to say such rules are revisable-requires that we do distinguish sentences in kind, e.g., as belonging to the system of sentences one is talking about or as part of the language used talking about some set of sentences.
Quine's thesis involves, however, that the principles governing deductive connections themselves form part of the total theory which, as a whole, confronts experience.... But, in that case there is nothing for the inferential links between sentences to consist in. They cannot be replaced by superinferential links, compelling us, if we accept certain logical principles, to accept also the consequences under those principles of other sentences we accept: for any such superlogical laws could in turn be formulated and considered as sentences no more immune to revision than any other (ibid., p. 596).
Quine, in broadening his notion of a theory to include all of logic has, Dummett claims, effectively eliminated the resources necessary for making statements about theories.
The problem arises only because Dummett refuses to distinguish DT from ENT. However, the naturalized epistemologist is free, within current physical theory, to distinguish between, e.g., the rules of inference and the object language sentences to which those rules apply (or, for that matter, to distinguish between observational sentences and theoretical ones). To acknowledge that these meta-logical rules are themselves part of a theory is not to vitiate the distinctions, for given ENT, it is precisely such constraints which the epistemologist has chosen to accept. Dummett's complaint has force, in other words, only if some 'point of cosmic exile', a standpoint independent of, and firmer than, current scientific theory is required. In denying, by DT, that the epistemologist can construct such a first philosophy, Quine has reconceived the epistemological project. The project for Quine is one of defending 'science from within, against its self doubts' (RR, p. 3); however, 'in confronting this challenge, the epistemologist may make free use of all scientific theory' (RI, p. 2). The problems for a Quinean epistemologist I Dummett, ibid., p. 596.
PAUL A. ROTH: THEORIES
(as for others) are about science, but for a Quinean, the answers to these problems, and to. questions concerning how human beings develop their theories in the broadest sense of that term, are questions to be answered from within science. Given DT, we cannot distinguish in kind between sentences, but given ENT, we can. Quine believes that ENT represents the best philosophic strategy in light of DT. Dummett confuses the former thesis with the latter, and so arrives at the mistaken conclusion that Quine's philosophy of language leaves us with a featureless collection of sentences and no way to talk about them. The claim that all human knowledge has an irremediably theoretical character is made on the basis of DT. DT is, of couse, possibly false; the point is that its truth or falsity is not tied to current scientific theory, and so DT remains unaffected by particular revisions in science.
Quine consistently develops, and, with equal consistency, fails to distinguish, two basic lines of argument in his epistemological writings. The first line is that which maintains that his Duhemian view obviates the very possibility of extra-theoretic knowledge, since truth and falsity are determined, given DT, by the standards of one or another theory. The DT constitutes his 'theory of theorizing', his prolegomena to a naturalized epistemology. It too is subject to revision, of course, but the Duhem premise is not a precept of some particular theory in science. DT applies at the level where the terms 'language' and 'theory' are interchangeable. Quine's second line of argument is intra-theoretic, and proceeds from his views on the revisability of natural scientific theories, and the consequences which this type of revision has on our attempt at scientific self-understanding. The problem here is to determine what falls within the scope of epistemology understood as a chapter of our (more or less) formal theory about the world. Here the primary focus is on the use and acquisition of language, and how language comes to have its important social qualities.
Quine consistently entangles these two lines of thought. However, when the strands of argument are held separate, it can be seen, for the issue considered above, that the asserted revisability of logical laws leads back to Quine's meta-theoretical concerns; the Duhem premise does not mandate the inviolability of logical laws. However, there are effective constraints imposed on any revision of such laws, although these, in turn, are grounded on intra-theoretic considerations.
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